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Abstract 
Both the law and culture make a central distinction between acts of commission that 
overturn the status quo and acts of omission that uphold it.  In everyday life acts of 
commission often elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission.  In this 
paper we compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts and ask whether behavior of 
subjects in three experiments is consistent with existing theory.  The design of the 
experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and 
Sadiraj, 2008) that make it observationally distinct from other theories.  We find support 
for this theory in all three experiments. 
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1. Introduction 
Does it make a difference whether an event results from action or inaction by 
another person?  In this paper we compare reciprocal responses to acts of commission 
that actively impose harm or kindness and acts of omission, representing failure to 
prevent harm or to act kindly.  We use three experiments to test a hypothesis implied by 
revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008), that acts of commission 
induce stronger reciprocal responses than comparable acts of omission.   
There are many everyday examples where acts of commission yield stronger 
reciprocal responses than do acts of omission.  For example, a waiter may be rewarded 
with an extremely large tip for going out of his way to serve a customer but might still be 
tipped according to the norm even if he failed to fulfill an extraordinary request.  A 
mobster may retaliate with a bloody vengeance because someone intentionally hurt his 
family member but might not hurt a bystander who did not prevent the harm.  Legal 
consequences may vary from probation to capital punishment to damages in millions of 
dollars depending on level of intent inferred from acts of commission or omission. 
Acts of commission vs. acts of omission have important implications for legal 
decisions because they are often used to infer defendants’ intentions.  In criminal law, 
actus reus (the act of committing a crime) and mens rea (the state of mind) are crucial 
when deciding whether a person is guilty of a specific crime, some other crime, or no 
crime.  The party responsible for the death of a human being can be convicted of 
criminally negligent homicide if the death was caused (beyond reasonable doubt) by a 
form of gross negligence.  For example, gross negligence includes the failure to stop and 
render aid in a hit-and-run accident, which is an act of omission.  A murder conviction, 
however, requires that the person had (beyond reasonable doubt) an intention to kill, 
which (in the vast majority of known murder cases) is inferred from acts of commission. 
 In tort law, compensatory damages are awarded for ordinary negligence due to the 
harmful consequences of an act of omission.  However, in a particularly egregious case 
where the tort was reasonably foreseeable and, despite this, the harmful act was 
committed then punitive damages may be awarded.
1, 2
 
                                                 
1
 “To support award of punitive damages, act which constitutes the cause of action must be activated by or 
accompanied with some evil intent, or must be the result of such gross negligence - such disregard of 
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The distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission has been 
explored in depth by philosophers whose main focus was on morality of the action.  
Some philosophers conclude that the distinction between the two types of acts is often 
morally irrelevant (Bennett 1966, 1981, 1983; Singer, 1979; Hare, 1981) while others 
argue for the relevance of the distinction (Kagan, 1988; Kamm, 1986; Steinbock, 1980).
3
 
Psychologists point out that some of the cases studied by philosophers often differ in 
other aspects than just acts of commission vs. omission and that philosophers themselves 
are often subject to psychological biases, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that 
there is no difference in morality between the two types of acts.  Under this assumption 
they study causes of the omission bias (i.e., when subjects judge harmful commissions as 
worse than the corresponding omissions), such as loss aversion, exaggeration effect, 
overgeneralization, and commissions being linked to causality judgments.
4
  The omission 
bias is closely related to the bias toward the status quo, “doing nothing or maintaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
another's rights - as is deemed equivalent to such intent.”  (Newport v. USAA 11 P.3d 190 Okla., 2000, 
July 18, 2000).  See also Feinberg (1984) on further discussion on how the law distinguishes between acts 
of commission and acts of omission. 
2
An interesting example of awarding punitive damages is the tobacco litigation.  In Florida, the information 
that the tobacco industry knew that cigarettes were harmful, nicotine was addictive, and there were risks 
from second-hand smoking, obtained in the mid-nineties by whistleblowers Merrell Williams and Jeffrey 
Wigand, was used for the first time in a jury trial.  It was the first time that an individual won a lawsuit for 
lung cancer.  In 2000, a Florida jury awarded the biggest punitive damages in US history at the time, 
$144.8 billion.  This lawsuit explored the pattern of lies and bogus claims produced by tobacco companies 
while knowing that the use of their product was detrimental to consumers’ health and could cause death.  
The jury foreman said:  “This verdict wasn’t about the state of the tobacco industry today. It was about 50 
years of fraud, misrepresentation, and lying to the American public.” (Tobacco News, 
www.tobacconews.org)  According to the jury verdict, the amount of punitive damages was not as 
important as the strong message of the large judgment and that Big Tobacco must – and will – be held 
accountable (Schlueter, 2005, p. 573-577). 
3
 A representative of this debate is the famous ethics thought experiment involving a trolley: “A trolley is 
running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad 
philosopher.  Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to 
safety.  Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing?” 
(Foot, 1978).  See also Thomson 1985; Unger, 1996; Kamm, 1989, Greene, 2007, Moll and de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007. 
 
4
 For a further discussion see Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991) who also present an interesting psychology 
experiment showing that subjects often rate harmful omissions as less bad than harmful commissions. 
Subjects’ ratings are associated with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes. 
 
3 
 
one’s current or previous decision” that Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found in risky 
as well as in riskless choices and which has also been found in reactions to outcomes 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Viscusi, Magat, and Huber, 1987; Knetsch, Thaler, and 
Kahneman, 1988; Ritov and Baron, 1992; Baron and Ritov, 1994).  The current paper 
digs deeper in exploring the impact of the status quo, which distinguishes acts of 
commission from acts of omission, by focusing on its relevance for the strength of 
reciprocal responses. 
The above examples offer straightforward illustration of the relationship between 
reciprocity and the status quo.  In fact, the intuition is so convincing that it has been 
formally embedded in the theory of revealed altruism (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 
2008).  A careful reader may quickly note that the examples are not fully spot-on with the 
theory (and they are not meant to be).  As is often the case with examples from everyday 
life, there are numerous features of the examples that vary systematically between the 
scenarios, which prevents their clean interpretation.
5
  A controlled laboratory 
environment, however, makes feasible a clean manipulation of the status quo while 
keeping everything else constant.  This enables us to test the hypothesized relationship 
between reciprocity and the status quo. 
The central question of our study can be stated as: Do acts of commission that 
overturn the status quo generate a stronger reciprocal response than acts of omission 
which uphold it?  Consider the following two stylized thought experiments. 
 
Scenario 1:  Your initial wealth is $100K and John’s initial wealth is $100K. 
A. Suppose John had an opportunity to give you $10K but did not do 
so.  Would you want to punish him?   
B. Now suppose John does give you $10K.  Would you want to 
reward him? 
 
                                                 
5
 For example, most, if not all, everyday life examples suffer from the fact that acts of commission differ 
from acts of omission in some other aspect(s) of behavior, usually the amount of effort necessary to take an 
action.   Such confounds can cloud the intuition and make it hard to unambiguously attribute the causality 
solely to the difference between commission and omission. 
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Scenario 2: Your initial wealth is $110K and John’s initial wealth is $90K.   
C. Suppose John had an opportunity to take $10K from you but did 
not do so.  Would you want to reward him? 
D. Now suppose that John does take $10K from you.  Would you 
want to punish him? 
 
The two scenarios highlight the relationship between reciprocity and status quo.  
In Scenario 1, the status quo is that you did not own the $10K and John: (i) did not give it 
to you (an act of omission); or (ii) did give it to you (an act of commission).  In Scenario 
2, the status quo is that you did own the $10K and John: (i) did not take it from you (an 
act of omission); or (ii) did take it from you (an act of commission).  
The importance of status quo and acts of commission or omission are particularly 
compelling when comparing scenario 1.A with 2.D and 1.B with 2.C.  In both scenarios 
1.A and 2.D, your final payoff is $100K and John’s final payoff is also $100K.  But in 
scenario 2.D John actively takes $10K from you while in scenario 1.A he passively 
makes no change in payoffs.  In both scenarios 1.B and 2.C your final payoff is $110K 
and John’s is $90K.  But in scenario 1.B John actively gives you $10K while in scenario 
2.C he passively makes no change. 
Distributional preference theories do not discriminate between acts of 
commission, acts of omission, and no opportunity to act and, hence, make no distinction 
between scenarios 1.A and 2.D nor between 1.B and 2.C.  These distinctions, however, 
are central to understanding reciprocal preferences.  Cox (2004) focused on the 
importance of the distinction between acts of commission vs. no opportunity to act in 
experimental designs for studying trust and reciprocity.  Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 
(2008) developed a theory of reciprocity that focuses on all three types of acts.  Their 
Axiom S captures the intuition behind the distinction between Scenarios 1 and 2: an act 
of commission implies stronger reciprocal response than an act of omission. (We give a 
detailed description of Axiom S in a later section.) 
Little empirical work, however, has focused on the effects of acts of commission 
vs. acts of omission defined relative to the status quo.  In this paper we report direct 
evidence on this topic.  We present three experiments specifically designed to 
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discriminate between revealed altruism theory and theories of distributional preferences 
that make no distinction between opportunities and payoffs resulting from acts of 
commission or acts of omission.  Experiments differ in the manner in which the status 
quo is induced.  This allows us to perform a check of robustness of the predictions of 
revealed altruism theory to alternative experimental protocols.   
Each experiment has two treatments in which we compare the behavior in two 
games that vary in terms of their induced status quo, i.e. with respect to their initial 
endowments, which creates the distinction between acts of commission and acts of 
omission.  Importantly, we keep the terminal payoffs in both games the same, which 
gives us a clean test of the empirical significance of opportunities and payoffs that result 
from acts of commission versus acts of omission.  
 
2.  Status Quo Treatments 
Our experimental design includes two treatments. In treatment 15,5T , shown in 
Figure 1, the first mover, Player A has an endowment of 15 dollars and the second 
mover, Player B has an endowment of 5 dollars.  Player A has two possible moves: she 
can choose “Uphold (15,5),” that is make no change in the endowments, or she can 
choose to “Give 5” out of her 15 dollar endowment to Player B.  If Player A chooses 
“Uphold (15,5)” then Player B has two possible choices: he can choose “No Decrease” or  
 
  
             Figure 1. Treatment 15,5T   
Player B Player B 
Player A 
Increase by 2 No Increase Decrease by 6 No Decrease 
Give 5 Uphold (15,5) 
15 
5 
9 
3 
10 
10 
12 
9 
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he can choose to “Decrease by 6” the endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 
dollars.  These possible choices in treatment 15,5T , and the money payoffs they yield, are 
shown on the left side (or leg) of Figure 1.  The top number at a terminal node of the 
game tree is the dollar payoff to Player A and the bottom number is the dollar payoff to 
Player B.  If Player A decides to “Give 5” to Player B then Player B has two possible 
choices: she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose to “Increase by 2” the 
endowment of Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar.  These possible choices in 
treatment 15,5T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of 
Figure 1.  
In treatment 10,10T , shown in Figure 2, both Player A and Player B have 10 dollar 
endowments.  Player A has two possible moves: she can choose to “Take 5” from Player 
B or choose “Uphold (10,10)”, that is make no change in the endowments.  If Player A 
chooses “Take 5” then Player B has two possible choices: he can choose “No Decrease” 
in the modified endowments or he can choose (to) “Decrease by 6” the modified 
endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 dollars.  These possible choices in 
treatment 10,10T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the left side (or leg) of 
Figure 2.  If Player A chooses “Uphold (10,10)” then Player B has two possible choices: 
she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose (to) “Increase by 2” the endowment of  
 
            Figure 2.  Treatment 10,10T   
Player B Player B 
Player A 
Increase by 2 No Increase Decrease by 6 No Decrease 
Uphold (10,10) Take 5 
15 
5 
9 
3 
10 
10 
12 
9 
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Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar.  These possible choices in treatment 10,10T , and 
the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of Figure 2.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 have the same ordered pairs of money payoffs at their 
corresponding terminal nodes.  However, in order to reach a terminal node with given 
money payoffs (x, y), Player A and Player B must choose a different sequence of actions 
in treatment 15,5T  than in treatment 10,10T .  Whether or not it is only the payoffs at the 
terminal nodes that are predicted to determine agent choices or, alternatively, both 
payoffs and actions, depends on the theoretical model.  In a theory of reciprocity, such as 
Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008), a first mover’s more or less generous action can 
make a second mover more or less altruistic. 
 
3.  Implications of Alternative Theoretical Models for Play in the Two Treatments 
 
3.1. The Two Status Quo Treatments Are Equivalent for Most Theories 
The theoretical predictions of the special case version of game theory for self-
regarding (or “economic man”) preferences are obvious.  Given that each player only 
cares about his own money payoff, Player A will choose Uphold (15,5) and Player B will 
choose No Decrease in treatment 15,5T , which results in the ordered pair of (Player A, 
Player B) payoffs of (15,5).  In treatment 10,10T , Player A will choose Take 5 and Player B 
will choose No Decrease, which results in the ordered pair of (Player A, Player B) 
payoffs of (15,5).  For this special case interpretation, treatment 15,5T  and treatment 10,10T  
involve the same game; the only difference between the games is a theoretically-
irrelevant difference in how the game is framed.   
Models of (unconditional) distributional preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Cox and Sadiraj (2007), and the model in (the text 
of) Charness and Rabin (2002) do not imply that all play will end at the (15,5) node in the 
two treatments because they model other-regarding or social preferences which are not 
necessarily the same as economic man preferences over ordered pairs of money payoffs. 
Furthermore, the different distributional preference models may have different 
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implications about which of the ordered pairs of payoffs at the terminal nodes will be 
preferred by Player B.  But all of these models represent social preferences in which an 
agent’s utility of alternative allocations of material payoffs depends only on the (absolute 
and relative) amounts of the payoffs themselves or on a priori beliefs, not on the agents’ 
acts of commission or omission that may be necessary to generate the allocations in any 
particular game.  Therefore, all of these models imply that Player B will make the same 
choice between two final payoff allocations, (a,b) or (c,d), in treatment 15,5T  as in 
treatment 10,10T .  According to these models, the only difference between treatment 15,5T  
and treatment 10,10T  is a difference in the framing of the same game that is theoretically 
irrelevant to prediction of play of the game.
6,7
   In contrast, according to revealed altruism 
theory treatments 15,5T  and 10,10T  involve two different games for which the theory makes 
distinct predictions about play of the games.   
  
3.2.  The Two Status Quo Treatments are Not Equivalent for Revealed Altruism Theory 
Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) or its special 
parametric form (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007) has previously predicted outcomes 
quite successfully in several different types of experiments including the dictator game 
(with and without earned endowments), ultimatum game, ultimatum mini-game, 
investment game, moonlighting game, Stackelberg duopoly game, Stackelberg mini-
                                                 
6
 The model in the text of Charness and Rabin (2002) implies that play in the two games will be the same.  
In contrast, an interpretation of the reciprocal preferences model in their appendix can lead to a different 
prediction, as follows.  If according to “social consensus” the choice of Take 5 in the 10,10T  game is 
considered to be “misbehavior” while choice of Uphold in the 15,5T  game is not, then Player B may place a 
higher weight on Player A’s payoff on the left branch of 15,5T  that on the left branch of 10,10T . The 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) models can have multiple equilibria. 
Adding an equilibrium selection criterion to either model will not discriminate between predicted equilibria 
for our 15,5T  and 10,10T  games.  Rather, the first-mover’s perception of what is “kind” would have to be 
made dependent on the (status-quo) endowment of the game, which would be an extension/reinterpretation 
of the models that could produce different behavioral predictions for our 15,5T  and 10,10T  games.    
7
 It has been argued that cumulative prospect theory (with loss aversion) implies that the T15,5 and T10,10 
games are not isomorphic.  This argument is critically examined in Appendix D. 
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game, and carrot and stick games.  The theory has also successfully predicted behavior in 
paired private property and common property trust games (Cox and Hall, 2010) and in 
paired asymmetric-power provision and appropriation games (Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, and 
Walker, 2013). 
Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) predicts that play 
will differ between the 15,5T  and 10,10T  treatments in the experiments reported here. 
Elements of that theory include a partial ordering of opportunity sets, a partial ordering of 
preferences, and two axioms about reciprocity.  The partial ordering of opportunity sets is 
as follows.  Let m denote Player B’s (“my”) money payoff and let y denote Player A’s 
(“your”) money payoff.  Let Hm
  denote my maximum money payoff in opportunity set 
H  and let Hy
  denote your maximum money payoff in opportunity set .H
8
  Opportunity 
set G  is “more generous than” opportunity set F  if: (a) 0G Fm m
    and (b) 
G Fm m
   G Fy y
   .  In that case, one writes G MGT F .  Part (a) in the definition of the 
MGT partial ordering is the statement that opportunity set G is more generous (to me) 
than is opportunity set F if my largest possible payoff in G is not less than my largest 
payoff in F.  The role of part (b) in the MGT definition is to discriminate between choices 
by you that are clearly intended to benefit me and other choices that might reflect “self-
serving generosity” in which you mainly intend to benefit yourself: G Fy y
   > G Fm m
  .  
 For example, our treatments 15,5T  and 10,10T  include the same two opportunity sets 
for Player B.  Let {(15,5),(9,3)}F   denote Player B’s opportunity set if Player A moves 
“left” and {(10,10),(12,9)}G  denote Player B’s opportunity set if Player A moves 
“right” in either treatment.  Note that, for these sets, G MGT F for Player B. 
 The partial ordering of preferences is as follows.  My willingness to pay (amounts 
of my material payoff, m) to increase your material payoff, y can depend on the absolute 
and relative amounts of our payoffs.  In the case where marginal utilities are well-
defined, my willingness to pay is given by the ratio of marginal utilities: 
                                                 
8
  More formally, sup{ : 0 . .( , ) }Hm m y s t m y H
      and sup{ : 0 . .( , ) }Hy y m s t m y H
     .   
10 
 
( , ) ( , ) / ( , )y mWTP m y u m y u m y .  Two different preference orderings, A  and B , over 
allocations of material payoffs might represent the preferences of two different agents or 
the preferences of the same agent in two different situations.  For a given domain D , 
preference ordering A  is “more altruistic than” preference ordering B  if 
( , ) ( , )A BWTP m y WTP m y  for all ( , )m y D .  In that case, we write A  MAT B . 
  Revealed altruism theory states that an individual’s preferences can become more 
or less altruistic depending on the actions of another agent.  Reciprocity, denoted as 
Axiom R, states that if a first mover provides a more (resp. less) generous opportunity set 
to the second mover then the second mover’s preferences will become more (resp. less) 
altruistic towards the first mover.
9
  Axiom R implies that Player B’s preferences will be 
more altruistic if Player A moves “right” than if she moves “left” in either treatment 15,5T  
or treatment 10,10T .   
Although the collection of opportunity sets that Player A can offer Player B are 
identical in treatments 15,5T  and 10,10T , the status quo set that corresponds to the 
endowments is different.  The more generous opportunity set in treatment 15,5T  is selected 
by an act of commission by Player A (giving $5 to Player B).  The more generous 
opportunity set in treatment  10,10T  is selected by an act of omission by Player A (making 
no change).  Similarly, the less generous opportunity set in the 10,10T  treatment is selected 
by an act of commission while the less generous opportunity set in the 15,5T  treatment is 
selected by an act of omission.   
Axiom S is the element of revealed altruism theory that implies that treatments 
15,5T  and 10,10T  are not isomorphic.  This axiom distinguishes between acts of commission, 
which overturn the status quo, and acts of omission which uphold the status quo. Axiom 
S says that the effect of Axiom R is stronger when a generous (or ungenerous) act 
overturns the status quo than when the same act merely upholds the status quo. Axiom S 
states that if the decision made by a first mover overturns the status quo then the 
                                                 
9
  See Appendix A for a formal definition of Axiom R. 
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reciprocal response, for individuals with preferences consistent with Axiom R, will be 
stronger than when the status quo is upheld.
10
 
A Player B with preferences consistent with Axioms R and S will care about how 
the opportunity set actually chosen by Player A compares to the other opportunity sets 
Player A could have chosen and also how the chosen set compares to the status quo 
opportunity set.  The theory predicts that a Player B will respond more altruistically 
towards a Player A who overturns the status quo in treatment 15,5T  by choosing Give 5 
than to a Player A in treatment 10,10T  who chooses Uphold (10,10), even though these 
actions provide Player B with the same opportunity set.  Similarly, a Player B will 
respond less altruistically to a Player A who overturns the status quo in treatment 10,10T  by 
choosing Take 5 than to a Player A who chooses Uphold (15,5) in treatment 15,5T  even 
though these actions provide Player B with the same opportunity set. 
The theoretical models reviewed in the preceding discussion provide testable 
hypotheses.  The null hypothesis is implied by economic man theory and all 
unconditional distributional preference theories.  The alternative hypothesis is implied by 
revealed altruism theory.   
 
oH : The distribution of play across the four terminal nodes is the same in treatments 
15,5T  and 10,10T . 
 
aH : Frequency of observation of nodes with payoffs (15,5) and (12,9) is greater in  
treatment 15,5T  than in treatment 10,10T . 
 
Revealed altruism theory includes self-regarding (or economic man) preferences 
as well as other-regarding preferences, and it includes non-reciprocal preferences as well 
as reciprocal preferences, because the partial orderings and statements of Axioms R and S 
all involve weak orderings (“greater than or equal to” or “preferred or indifferent to”).  
                                                 
10
  See Appendix A for a formal definition of Axiom S. 
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This implies that there are two ways in which data can be used to test the above 
hypothesis.  The most straightforward way to test the hypothesis is to use data for all 
Players B in the experiment.  A more nuanced use of the data reflects finer points in the 
structure of revealed altruism theory in that “Axiom S says that the effect of Axiom R is 
stronger …”  This approach uses data to test the predictions of Axiom S only for subjects 
who have revealed consistency with the strict-preference version of Axiom R, that is, 
subjects whose choices in the experiment reveal that they are (positively or negatively) 
reciprocal.   Data for other subjects, whose choices in the experiment are consistent with 
both self-regarding preferences and weakly reciprocal preferences, are not used in this 
more nuanced test of Axiom S.  Tests based on both approaches are reported below. 
 
4. Three Experiments 
The key to experimental testing of Axiom S in the laboratory is a successful 
implementation of the status quo.  Out in the field the status quo arises naturally.  In a 
laboratory setting, however, subjects encounter stylized decision problems in which they 
often lack clear ex-ante expectations.  In our experiments three different design features 
are used to induce status quo:  
(i) Initial endowments: subjects start off playing the game with initial money 
balances of $15 or $5 in treatments 15,5T  and $10 each in treatments 10,10T .  
Feasible actions are possible changes in these money balances. 
(ii) Labeling of actions: we label actions that do not cause any change in 
payoffs as “no change in payoffs” and actions that lead to changes in 
payoffs as “give/take x” or “increase/decrease by y”. 
(iii) Entitlements: in Experiment 1 the initial endowments are assigned 
randomly.  In Experiments 2 and 3 endowments are earned.  We use a 
two-day experimental procedure which has subjects earn their monetary 
endowments in a laborious task on the Day 1 of the experiment.  
Experiment 2 employs a tournament format in which higher endowments 
are received for better performance.  In Experiment 3 we randomly assign 
subjects into different sessions and ask everyone in a given session to 
13 
 
attain the same target performance level.  The higher the target level in a 
session, the higher the amount earned.  
The first two design features complement one another and provide a natural way 
of establishing the status quo.  By (i) and (ii) the status quo is set by the initial money 
balances that will subsequently be changed or preserved by Player A via feasible actions.  
Feature (iii), however, deserves a few more comments.  In Experiments 2 and 3 we opted 
to have the subjects earn their endowments in order to induce property right entitlements 
that better justify the labeling of actions (as “give” or “take” and “decrease” or 
“increase”).  In addition we used a two-day format that separates the earnings task from 
the strategic play of the game.  The intention was to give subjects some time to “bond” 
with the earnings so they can perceive them as their own property rather than “house 
money.”  The so-called “house money effect” has been documented to encourage risk 
taking (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul, 1990; Thaler, 1990; Thaler and Johnson, 1990; 
Arkes, Joyner, Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, and Stone, 1994; Keasey and Moon, 1996; 
Cárdenas, De Roux, Jaramillo, and Martinez, forthcoming).  Clark (2002) finds no effect 
of house money in the voluntary contributions mechanism public goods game using 
unconditional nonparametric methods.  Harrison (2007), however, shows that the same 
data display a significant effect when analyzing responses at the individual level and 
accounting for the error structure of the panel data.   
Several previous studies have found a notable effect of earned (rather than 
randomly assigned) endowments on subsequent behavior (e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, 
Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Rutström and Williams, 2000; Cherry, Frykblom, and 
Shogren, 2002; Gächter and Riedl, 2005, Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008).  Cox and Hall 
(2010) tested robustness of the Cox, Ostrom, and Walker et al. (2009) empirical 
observation that the behavior of second movers does not differ between common-
property and private-property trust games that include a rich strategy space for both 
players.  Cox and Hall had their subjects earn their endowments in a real effort task prior 
to playing a common-property or private-property trust game and found the behavior of 
their second movers to be consistent with Axiom S, which has different predictions in the 
two games. 
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We conducted four one-day sessions in Experiment 1, six two-day sessions in 
Experiment 2 and five two-day sessions in Experiment 3.  All sessions were held in the 
New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of 
Canterbury.  A total of 416 undergraduate subjects participated in the study.  On average, 
a one-day session lasted about 60 minutes including the initial instruction period and 
payment of subjects.  A two-day session lasted about 120 minutes.  The experimental 
earnings, denoted in $, were converted into cash at the 3 to 4 exchange rate: $3 (or 3 lab 
$) equals 4 New Zealand dollars, henceforth NZD.  In Experiment 1 subject payments 
included a 5 NZD show up fee. In Experiments 2 and 3 the show up fee was 10 NZD 
(i.e., 5 NZD for each of the two days), all paid at the end of the Day 2 session.
 
 
 
4.1 Experiment 1: Randomly Assigned Endowments 
Experiment 1 presents a stylized test of Axiom S in which initial endowments 
(and thus also the roles) were randomly assigned by the experimenter. In what follows we 
refer to Experiment 1 treatments as RANDOM 15,5T and RANDOM 10,10T .  The treatments 
were implemented in a between-subjects design.  All sessions were run manually using 
the strategy method (Selten, 1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011).  The design also 
included use of a double blind payoff protocol in which a subject's decisions are never 
linked with the subject's identity. 
In treatment RANDOM 15,5T  Player A started with $15 and Player B with $5.  
The available choices were described to subjects as follows:  Player A had to choose 
whether to give $5 to an anonymously paired Player B or to make no change in payoffs.   
If Player A decided to give $5, Player B could either make no further change in payoffs 
or decrease his own payoff by $1 in order to increase Player A’s payoff by $2.  If Player 
A decided to make no change in endowments, Player B could either make no further 
change in payoffs or decrease her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease Player A’s 
payoff by $6. 
In treatment RANDOM 10,10T  Player A had to choose whether to take $5 from an 
anonymously paired Player B or to make no change in endowments.  If Player A decided 
to make no change in endowments, Player B could either make no further change in 
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endowments or decrease his own payoff by $1 in order to increase Player A’s payoff by 
$2.  If Player A decided to take $5, Player B could either make no further change in 
endowments or decrease her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease Player A’s payoff by 
$6. Experiment instructions are provided in Appendix B. 
 
4.2 Experiment 1 Results 
We first describe the data and then compare subjects’ behavior in three ways: (i) 
for the whole game trees; (ii) for corresponding subgames; and (iii) for corresponding 
subgames after eliminating subjects who have not revealed reciprocal preferences. 
Sixty-six subjects (or thirty-three pairs) participated in treatment RANDOM 15,5T  
and sixty-eight subjects (or thirty-four pairs) in treatment RANDOM 10,10T .  In treatment 
RANDOM 15,5T , twelve (=36.4%) A Players chose to Uphold (15,5) while twenty-one A 
Players chose to Give 5 to their counterpart Player B.  In treatment RANDOM 10,10T , 
twenty-six (=76.5%) chose to Take 5 while only eight chose to Uphold (10,10).
 11
   This 
difference in A Players’ behavior is statistically significant (p=0.001, Fisher’s exact two-
sided test).
 12,13
 
 B Players’ choices were elicited by the strategy method.  Each player B thus made 
two choices, one for each of the two subgames.  Data for All B Players are reported in the 
upper panel of Table 1.  Following the Uphold (15,5) decision by Player A in treatment 
RANDOM 15,5T , seven (=21.2%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff 
by 6, while the remaining twenty-six chose No Decrease.  Following the Give 5 decision, 
twelve (=36.4%) B Players rewarded A Players by choosing Increase by 2, while the 
remaining twenty-one chose No Increase. 
 
                                                 
11
 Player A’s behavior is summarized in Table 4 in Section 4. 
12
 All subsequent p-values in this paper refer to Fisher’s exact test. 
13
 Throughout the paper we report one-sided test in all cases when we have clear theoretical predictions and 
when the nature of the data allows us to do so. 
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Table 1: Player B Behavior in Experiment 1  
 No Decrease Decrease by 6 No Increase Increase by 2 
All B Players 
RANDOM 15,5T  26/33 (78.8%) 7/33 (21.2%) 21/33 (63.6%) 12/33 (36.4%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
RANDOM 10,10T  20/34 (58.8%) 14/34 (41.2%) 32/34 (94.1%) 2/34 (5.9%) 
Fisher’s Test for 
Strategies 
0.004
a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.067 0.002 
  
Reciprocal B Players 
RANDOM 15,5T  10/17 (58.8%) 7/17 (41.2%) 5/17 (29.4%) 12/17 (70.6%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
RANDOM 10,10T  1/15 (6.7%) 14/15 (93.3%) 13/15 (86.7%) 2/15 (13.3%) 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames  
0.002 0.001 
a
 two-sided test. 
 
Following the Take 5 decision by Player A in treatment RANDOM 10,10T , 
fourteen (=41.2%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff by 6, while the 
remaining twenty chose No Decrease.  Following the Uphold (10,10) decision by Player 
A, only two (=5.9%) B Players rewarded Player A by Increasing his payoff by 2, while 
the remaining thirty-two chose No Increase. 
The data are consistent with the testable implications of Axiom S; our next 
question is whether the observed difference in play between the two games is statistically 
significant.  First we test the null hypothesis that behavior of B Players does not differ 
between the two treatments.
14
  However, we cannot simply compare the choice-
frequencies at the terminal nodes because use of the strategy method makes the choice 
                                                 
14
 Recall that all models discussed in subsection 3.1 predict that the behavior of B Players in the two 
treatments will be the same. 
17 
 
data not independent across nodes within a subgame.  However, each subject’s chosen 
strategy (a pair of choices, one for each subgame) is an independent observation.  
Therefore, we first classify the behavior of each subject into one of four possible 
strategies: 1. No Decrease-No Increase (ND-NI); 2. No Decrease-Increase by 2 (ND-
IB2); 3. Decrease by 6-No Increase (DB6-NI); 4. Decrease by 6-Increase by 2 (DB6-
IB2).  Then, we run Fisher’s exact test on the strategies rather than the choices.15  This 
implements the test of the null hypothesis from section 3.2, i.e., that the behavior in the 
two treatments is the same.  The test rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
(p=0.004, two-sided test), thus providing strong support for Axiom S in Experiment 1 
data. 
  A tougher test of Axiom S would be to test its implication in each individual 
subgame.  In particular, for the subgame on the left side of the game tree it implies that 
the frequency of “Decrease by 6” will be higher in treatment RANDOM 10,10T than in 
RANDOM 15,5T .  The one-sided Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant 
difference between frequencies with which the Decrease by 6 choice was selected in the 
two treatments (p=0.067).  For the subgame on the right side Axiom S implies that the 
frequency of Increase by 2 is higher in treatment RANDOM 15,5T  than RANDOM 10,10T .  
The one-sided Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant difference (p=0.002).   
Finally, recall that Axiom S states that if the decision made by Player A overturns 
the status quo then the reciprocal response, for B Players with preferences consistent with 
Axiom R, will be stronger than when the status quo is upheld.  Therefore, a conservative 
test of the status quo effect focuses on individuals who revealed strictly reciprocal 
preferences by making at least one decision to punish or reward another participant at a 
monetary cost to themselves.  In other words, we exclude B Players who chose No 
change in both subgames from further analysis.  Player B’s behavior after such 
elimination is presented in the bottom panel of Table 1.  Using data from B Players who 
demonstrated reciprocal preferences, Axiom S passes a strict test in each of the individual 
subgames (p=0.002 and 0.001, respectively for the left and right subgames). 
 
                                                 
15
 The proper categorization of the data into strategies is presented in Table 5 at the end of this section. 
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4.3 Experiment 2: Endowments Earned in a Tournament 
As argued above, the test of Axiom S hinges on saliency of the status quo.  In 
Experiment 1 entitlements to the initial endowments were created by a stylized 
experimental procedure – random assignment. In everyday life, however, entitlements are 
usually created in a more natural way, for example by exchanging one’s skills, effort and 
time for a payment.  In what follows we present two additional experiments that serve as 
robustness checks for Axiom S with respect to procedures by which entitlements were 
induced.  Our designs mimic two common labor market compensation practices, 
tournaments and absolute (or fixed) performance targets.  Our subjects earn initial 
endowments by their performance in a GMAT quiz.  
In Experiment 2 subjects compete in a tournament which places them in three 
different groups based on their performance in the quiz.  Groups with better performance 
receive higher endowments.  The subjects were recruited for a two-day experiment.  On 
Day 1 of the experiment each participant was asked to answer the same set of 40 math 
questions, selected from the GMAT test bank.  The quiz score was the number of 
questions the subject answered correctly minus 1/4 of a point for each incorrect answer.   
After everyone completed the computerized quiz (programmed in Visual Basic), the final 
scores were ranked from the highest to the lowest and ties were resolved randomly.  Once 
the complete ranking of the participants had been determined, the participants who scored 
in the top 25% received an IOU certificate for $15, those in the middle 25-75% received 
a $10 certificate, and those in the bottom 25% received a $5 certificate.
16
  These 
certificates provided the endowments for Day 2 participation.  Subjects who earned $15 
or $5 were invited to the same session on Day 2 while subjects who earned $10 were all 
invited to a session that started at a different time on Day 2. 
                                                 
16
 Note that the tournament procedure puts subjects to treatments based on their performance on the Day 1 
task.  This is, however, a natural consequence of assigning endowments in this manner and an important 
part of the robustness-check exercise.  A reader might be curious about a possible link between reciprocal 
preferences and analytical skills.  We are not aware of any such result published in the literature.  
Furthermore, our other two experiments (1 and 3) had random assignment to treatments and the results are 
very much in line with the results in the tournament experiment.  See subsection 4.8 for a comparison of B 
Players’ behavior across experiments. 
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The two different Day 2 sessions constituted our experimental treatments 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  and TOURNAMENT 10,10T  implemented in a between-subjects 
design.  Day 2 sessions used procedures identical to Experiment 1 with the only 
difference that the endowments were earned in Day 1.  In treatment TOURNAMENT 
15,5T  this implied that the roles were also determined based on subjects’ performance on 
Day 1.  In treatment TOURNAMENT 10,10T  the subjects were assigned to be either Player 
A or Player B in a random way.  
 
4.4 Experiment 2 Results 
  Seventy subjects (or thirty-five pairs) participated in each of the two treatments 
in Experiment 2. In treatment TOURNAMENT 15,5T , twenty-three (=65.7%) A Players 
chose to Uphold (15,5) while twelve A Players chose to Give 5 to their counterpart Player 
B. In treatment TOURNAMENT 10,10T , twelve (=34.3%) chose to Take 5 while twenty-
three chose to Uphold (10,10).   This difference in A Players’ behavior is statistically 
significant (p=0.016), suggesting that the status quo is an important consideration for the 
subjects.   
 Data for All B Players are reported in the upper panel of Table 2.  Corresponding 
to the Uphold (15,5) decision by Player A in treatment TOURNAMENT 15,5T , only eight 
(=22.9%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff by 6, while the 
remaining twenty-seven chose No Decrease.  Corresponding to the Give 5 decision, 
sixteen (=45.7%) B Players rewarded Player A by choosing Increase by 2, while the 
remaining nineteen chose No Increase. 
Corresponding to the Take 5 decision by Player A in treatment TOURNAMENT 
10,10T , eleven (=31.4%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff by 6, while 
the remaining twenty-four chose No Decrease.  Corresponding to the Uphold (10,10) 
decision by Player A, six (=17.1%) B Players rewarded Player A by Increasing his payoff 
by 2, while the remaining twenty-nine chose No Increase. 
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Table 2: B Players’ Behavior in Experiment 2  
 No Decrease Decrease by 6 No Increase Increase by 2 
All B Players 
TOURNAMENT 
15,5T  
27/35 (77.1%) 8/35 (22.9%) 19/35 (54.3%) 16/35 (45.7%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
TOURNAMENT 
10,10T  
24/35 (68.6%) 11/35 (31.4%) 29/35 (82.9%) 6/35 (17.1%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.061
a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.296 0.01 
  
Reciprocal B Players 
TOURNAMENT 
15,5T  
13/21 (61.9%) 8/21 (38.1%) 5/21 (23.8%) 16/21 (76.2%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
TOURNAMENT 
10,10T  
4/15 (26.7%) 11/15 (73.3%) 9/15 (60%) 6/15 (40%) 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames  
0.039 0.032 
a
 two-sided test. 
 
We proceed to testing Axiom S with data from Experiment 2.  Fisher’s test for 
strategies rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p=0.061, two-sided), 
again providing support for Axiom S.  As before, for the subgame on the left side of the 
game tree Axiom S implies that the frequency of Decrease by 6 will be higher in 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T than in TOURNAMENT 15,5T .  However, the one-sided Fisher's 
exact test does not detect a difference between frequencies with which the Decrease by 6 
choice was selected in the two treatments (p=0.296).  For the subgame on the right side, 
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Fisher’s test detects that the frequency of Increase by 2 is higher in TOURNAMENT 
15,5T  than TOURNAMENT 10,10T  as predicted by Axiom S (p=0.01).  
The lower panel Table 2 reports data for the subset of subjects who revealed 
strictly reciprocal preferences by making at least one decision to punish or reward.  After 
removing B Players who chose No change in both subgames, the test rejects the null on 
both sides of the game tree (p=0.039 and p=0.032, respectively, for the left and right 
subgames). 
 
4.5 Experiment 3: Earned Endowments by Reaching a Target Output 
Experiment 3 presents a second robustness check for Axiom S with respect to 
procedures by which entitlements were induced.  Recall that in Experiment 2 subjects’ 
performance in a tournament determined their initial endowment (and thus also the roles) 
in Day 2 part of the experiment.  In Experiment 3 subjects performed the same earning 
task of solving GMAT problems, except that their assignment to roles was random.  This 
was accomplished by the following procedure.  On Day 1 of the experiment participants 
were asked to correctly answer 10, 20 or 30 problems, depending on a session they were 
recruited for.  There was no penalty for providing an incorrect answer.  For reaching one 
of the three target performance levels they received an IOU certificate for $5, $10, or 
$15, respectively.  These certificates provided the endowments for Day 2 participation.  
The rest of the procedures were identical to Experiment 2. 
 
4.6 Experiment 3 Results 
Seventy-two subjects (or thirty-six pairs) participated in each of the two 
treatments in Experiment 3.  In treatment TARGET 15,5T , twenty-six (=72.2%) A Players 
chose to Uphold (15,5) while ten A Players chose to Give 5 to their counterpart Player B.  
In treatment TARGET 10,10T , eighteen (=50%) chose to Take 5 while the other eighteen 
chose to Uphold (10,10).  This difference in A Players’ behavior between the two 
treatments is weakly significant (p=0.090). 
Data for All B Players in Experiment 3 are reported in the upper panel of Table 3.  
Following the Uphold (15,5) decision by Player A in treatment TARGET 15,5T , ten 
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(=28.6%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff by 6, while the 
remaining twenty-five chose No Decrease.
17
  Following the Give 5 decision, eleven 
(=30.6%) B Players rewarded Player A by choosing Increase by 2, while the remaining 
twenty-five chose No Increase. 
 
Table 3: Player B Behavior in Experiment 3  
 No Decrease Decrease by 6 No Increase Increase by 2 
All B Players 
TARGET 15,5T  25/35* (71.4%) 10/35* (28.6%) 25/36 (69.4%) 11/36 (30.6%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
TARGET 10,10T  19/36 (52.8%) 17/36 (47.2%) 30/36 (83.3%) 6/36 (16.7%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.211
a 
Fisher’s Test 
for Subgames 
0.084 0.133 
  
Reciprocal B Players 
TARGET 15,5T  8/18 (44.4%) 10/18 (55.6%) 7/18 (38.9%) 11/18 (61.1%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
TARGET 10,10T  4/21 (19%) 17/21 (81%) 15/21 (71.4%) 6/21 (28.6%) 
Fisher’s Test 
for Subgames  
0.086 0.042 
a
 two-sided test. 
* One Player B did not provide an answer on the left side of the game tree. 
 
Following the Take 5 decision by Player A in treatment TARGET 10,10T , 
seventeen (=47.2%) B Players punished Player A by Decreasing his payoff by 6, while 
the remaining nineteen chose No Decrease.  Following the Uphold (10,10) decision by 
                                                 
17
 Although there were 36 B Players in treatment TARGET 15,5T , one of them provided only an answer on 
the right side of the game tree, but not on the left one.  We report this decision in the summary statistics but 
since we do not know this person’s strategy, we have excluded the data point from the statistical analysis. 
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Player A, six (=16.7%) B Players rewarded Player A by Increasing his payoff by 2, while 
the remaining thirty chose No Increase. 
As before, we test the null hypothesis that behavior of B Players does not differ 
between the two treatments using the Fisher’s exact test for strategies.  Although the 
pattern of behavior goes in the right direction, i.e., as predicted by Axiom S, the 
difference is not significant (p=0.211, two-sided).  Next, we proceed with testing the 
implications of Axiom S for the individual subgames.  On the left hand side of the game 
tree we find that the frequency of Decrease by 6 is higher in TARGET 10,10T than in 
TARGET 15,5T  (p=0.084), as predicted by Axiom S.  For the subgame on the right hand 
side, Axiom S predicts that the frequency of Increase by 2 will be higher in TARGET 
15,5T  than TARGET 10,10T , however, the result of the Fisher’s exact test reveals that this 
difference is marginally insignificant in Experiment 3 (p=0.133).  
As shown in the lower panel of Table 3, when performing the same tests on 
reciprocal B Players only, we find significant differences in behavior on both sides of the 
game tree (p=0.086 and p=0.042, respectively, for the left and right subgames). 
 
 4.7 The Effect of Endowment Allocation Procedures on A Players’ Behavior  
 While the main focus of the current paper is on the reciprocal behavior of B 
Players, let us start by briefly discussing the differences in A Players’ behavior who show 
a great sensitivity to procedures under which the initial endowments were allocated.   
Table 4 summarizes and compares their behavior in our three experiments.  We observe a 
significant difference in A Players’ behavior between the two treatments in all three 
experiments (p=0.001 for RANDOM 15,5T  vs. RANDOM 10,10T ; p=0.016 for 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. TOURNAMENT 10,10T  and p=0.09 for TARGET 15,5T  vs. 
TARGET  10,10T ).  We also find a significant difference in frequencies of choosing to 
Give 5 between RANDOM 15,5T  treatment where the windfall initial endowments were 
assigned randomly by the experimenters and treatments TOURNAMENT 15,5T and 
TARGET 15,5T where the endowments were earned (p=0.028 and p=0.004, respectively).   
The evidence that A Players were less generous when they had to earn their endowments  
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Table 4.  Comparison of A Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
 
15,5T  10,10T  
 Give 5 Uphold (15,5) Uphold (10,10) Take 5 
Experiment 1: RANDOM assignment 21/33 (63.6%) 12/33 (36.4%) 8/34 (23.5%) 26/34 (76.5%) 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. RANDOM 10,10T  0.001 
 
Experiment 2: TOURNAMENT  12/35 (34.3%) 23/35 (65.7%) 23/35 (65.7%) 12/35 (34.3%) 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  
0.016
 
 
Experiment 3: TARGET  10/36 (27.7%) 26/36 (72.3 %) 18/36 (50%) 18/36 (50%) 
TARGET 15,5T  vs. TARGET  10,10T  0.09 
 
Tests for 15,5T Treatments (Give 5) 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TOURNAMENT 15,5T  0.028 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.004 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.614 
 
Tests for 10,10T Treatments (Take 5) 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TOURNAMENT 10,10T  0.001 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.028 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.232 
All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 4 are two-sided. 
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is in line with previous findings by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002),  Oxoby and 
Spraggon (2008),  and Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2012) on this issue.  We do not find 
any differences in giving behavior between TOURNAMENT 15,5T and TARGET 15,5T  
treatments (p=0.614). 
Comparison of treatment RANDOM 10,10T with TOURNAMENT 10,10T  and 
TARGET 10,10T  reveals that the frequency of Take 5 is higher when the endowments are 
assigned randomly  than when they are earned (p=0.001 and p=0.028, respectively), 
indicating that subjects honor property rights created by performance in the math quiz.  
Despite the fact that there appears to be more taking when the endowments were earned 
by reaching a target output than in a tournament (50% vs. 34.3%, respectively), the 
Fisher’s exact test does not detect a significant difference between TOURNAMENT 
10,10T  and TARGET 10,10T  treatments (p=0.232). 
 
4.8 Tests for Differences in B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
To assess the impact of earned endowments on Player B reciprocal responses, we 
compare their behavior in the respective treatments using data categorized by strategies, 
presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Raw Data on B Players’ Behavior Categorized According to Strategies 
 Strategies 
Treatment ND-NI ND-IB2 DB6-NI DB6-IB2 
RANDOM 15,5T  
n = 33 
16 10 5 2 
RANDOM 10,10T  
n = 34 
19 1 13 1 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  
n =35  
14 13 5 3 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  
n = 35 
20 4 9 2 
TARGET 15,5T  
n =35  
17 8 7 3 
TARGET 10,10T  
n = 36 
15 4 15 2 
 
POOLED DATA 15,5T  
n =103 
47 31 17 8 
POOLED DATA 10,10T  
n = 105 
54 9 37 5 
ND = No Decrease; DB6 = Decrease by 6; NI = No Increase; IB2 = Increase by 2 
 
We begin by testing the impact of endowment protocols in the 15,5T  treatments.  Fisher’s 
exact tests, reported in the first two rows of Table 6 reveal that there are no differences in 
B Players’ behavior whether their endowments represent a windfall gain and are 
randomly assigned or earned in a tournament or by reaching a target output (p=0.897 and 
0.882, respectively).  Given that, it is not surprising that the (tournament or target) type of 
earning procedure does not influence their decisions either (p=0.606).  A similar pattern 
emerges for the 10,10T  treatments where the respective p-values are equal to 0.488, 0.500, 
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and 0.520, suggesting that a random assignment of endowments was sufficient to 
establish strong enough property right entitlements for the manifestation of Axiom S 
effects in subjects’ reciprocal behavior.  Moreover, it also provides evidence that the 
tournament procedure in Experiment 2 did not incidentally select different reciprocal 
types into different treatments based on their GMAT performance.
18
 
However, in light of the above results the weak support of Axiom S in 
Experiment 3 might seem a bit puzzling.  When inspecting the data in Tables 2 and 3, one 
might notice that this could be driven by a marginally greater percentage of subjects who 
punished (chose Decrease by 6) Player A for not giving them 5 in the TARGET 15,5T  
treatment and a slightly lower percentage of subjects who rewarded (chose Increase by 2) 
Player A for giving 5 than in TOURNAMENT 15,5T .  While this change in behavior was 
not sufficient to detect significant differences in play between the two treatments, it had 
implications for the support of Axiom S when using data categorized according to 
strategies which could be due to entitlements.  When designing the experiments we 
conjectured that property right entitlements depend on the following three factors: (1) 
opportunity cost of coming to the lab, f; (2) effort-based performance in the lab, p(e); and 
(3) time spent bonding with money, b(m(e)), i.e., an entitlement is a function 
     , ,E f p e b m e  increasing in all its arguments.  Based on the current data we 
speculate that in Experiment 3 the factor f dominated the other two factors, since the $5 
subjects who also had to come to the lab on two consecutive days as the $15 subjects 
behaved as if they felt entitled to more than $5.  In Experiment 2 this effect appears to be 
muted by subjects’ performance in a tournament that possibly legitimizes the differences 
in payoffs. 
                                                 
18
 Recall that in Experiment 2 the subjects were ranked based on their performance, which determined their 
initial endowments.  Our experimental design thus compares reciprocal behavior of subjects who were 
better in math and earned $10 with those who scored worse and earned $5.  
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          Table 6.  Tests for B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
Tests for 15,5T Treatments 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TOURNAMENT 15,5T  0.897 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.882 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.606 
 
Tests for 10,10T Treatments 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TOURNAMENT 10,10T  0.488 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.500 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.520 
All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 6 are two-sided. 
 
Finally, it is also possible that having to earn one’s endowment increased the costs 
of reciprocity which in turn decreased the frequency of punishment and rewarding. 
However, this is not what we see in the data.  Moreover, a recent study by Danková and 
Servátka (2013), where in a two-player Taking Game the extent and frequency of 
punishment increases when subjects use their earned endowments as opposed to when a 
windfall endowment is assigned to them by the experimenter, rejects this conjecture.  
 
4.9 Testing for Axiom S Using Pooled Data 
Given that we do not find any differences in B Players’ behavior across the three 
experiments, we pool all data together and perform tests for the overall effect.  The 
Fisher’s exact test for data categorized according to strategies rejects the null hypothesis 
that the distribution of play across the four terminal nodes is the same in treatments 15,5T  
and 10,10T  with very high confidence (p=0.000).  The pooled data in the strategy form is 
presented in the bottom two rows of Table 5. 
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 Table 7 presents pooled data on Player B’s behavior according to the distribution 
of play.  For the subgame on the left side, Fisher’s test detects that the frequency of 
Decrease by 6 will be higher in 10,10T than in 15,5T  as predicted by Axiom S (p=0.011).  
For the subgame on the right side, Fisher’s test detects that the frequency of Increase by 2 
is higher in 15,5T  than 10,10T  as predicted by Axiom S (p=0.000).  After removing self-
regarding B Players who chose No change in both subgames (lower panel in Table 7), the 
test also rejects the null on both sides of the game tree (p=0.000 for both subgames). 
 
Table 7. Pooled Data on B Players’ Behavior 
 No Decrease Decrease by 6 No Increase Increase by 2 
All B Players 
15,5T  78/103* 
(75.7%) 
25/103* 
(24.3%) 
65/104  
(62.5%) 
39/104  
(37.5%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
10,10T  63/105  
(60%) 
42/105  
(40%) 
91/105  
(86.7%) 
14/105  
(13.3%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.000
a 
Fisher’s Test 
for Subgames 
0.011 0.000 
  
Reciprocal B Players 
TARGET 15,5T  31/56  
(55.4%) 
25/56  
(44.6%) 
17/56  
(30.4%) 
39/56  
(69.4%) 
Axiom S 
Prediction 
- < - > 
TARGET 10,10T  9/51  
(17.6%) 
42/51  
(82.4%) 
37/51  
(72.5%) 
14/51  
(27.5%) 
Fisher’s Test 
for Subgames  
0.000 0.000 
a
 two-sided test. 
* Recall that in Experiment 3 one Player B did not provide an answer on the left side of the game tree. 
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6. Discussion 
We have presented three experiments that discriminate between revealed altruism 
theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) and alternative theories of social preferences.  
The design of our experiments is focused on the empirical validity of Axiom S, the 
component of revealed altruism theory that implies that (positively and negatively) 
reciprocal responses will be more pronounced when they are motivated by acts of 
commission than by acts of omission.  We find clear evidence in favor of Axiom S (status 
quo) and Axiom R (reciprocity) and against theories of unconditional social preferences 
in which willingness to pay to increase or decrease another person’s material payoff is 
invariant to their actions.  
The primary difference between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3 is the 
saliency of entitlements to endowments.  Based on previous experimental evidence on 
earned endowments and behavior, we conjectured that earned endowments could be key 
to the empirical bite of Axiom S and the intensity of reciprocal reactions towards acts of 
commission.  In everyday life the money in one’s wallet is in most cases earned and 
regarded by the owner as being well deserved.  People routinely exchange their time and 
effort for wages to which they form a strong sense of ownership or entitlement.  In the 
laboratory, we cannot ask subjects to play with their own money and therefore 
entitlements are not easily established.  In our Experiments 2 and 3 we approached this 
problem by splitting the experiment into two days and having subjects earn their 
endowments on Day 1 of the experiment.  Not only did the subjects have to work for the 
endowments but they also had some time between the earning part and the game part to 
develop a sense of ownership of their earnings (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998).  
Earned endowments significantly affected giving and taking by first movers but to our 
surprise had insignificant effect on second movers’ reciprocal responses.  The behavior 
predicted by Axiom S was prevalent in Experiments 1 and 2, but the effect, although 
visible, was not significant in Experiment 3.  However, since we do not observe any 
significant differences in behavior across the three experiments, we pool the data and find 
clear support for Axiom S in pooled data as well as in Experiment 1 and 2 data 
separately.  Our results highlight the importance of the clear distinction between acts of 
commission and acts of omission (see also Blount, 1995; Charness, 2004).  
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Our data show that subjects with reciprocal preferences are quite sensitive to acts 
of commission, i.e., acts that overturn the status quo.  In our experiments we have 
developed a procedure that makes the status quo salient rather naturally.  It involves an 
experimental design with specification of endowments and feasible actions that make acts 
of commission, such as giving or taking, stand in stark contrast with acts of omission, 
such as not giving or not taking when there is an opportunity to do so. 
One can ask whether this approach would be generally effective for establishing a 
status quo in experiments.  Experience, habits, customs and norms are likely to play an 
important role in some contexts.  From this perspective field experimentation might be 
another fruitful avenue for future research on the empirical significance of acts of 
commission vs. acts of omission.  The field has the advantage that both the status quo and 
entitlements to endowments arise naturally.  However, the complexity and richness of the 
field environment might make it difficult for researchers to identify the status quo 
conditions that are perceived by participants. 
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Appendix A: Definitions and Axioms of Revealed Altruism Theory 
 
These definitions and axioms are taken from Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008).  Let A  
and B denote two preference orderings, those of two different agents or the same agent in 
two different situations.  Preference orderings for a second mover are defined on the 
second-mover agent’s own (“my”) money payoff m and the first-mover agent’s (“your”) 
money payoff y .  ( , )AWTP m y  is the willingness of the agent with preferences A  to pay 
an amount of their own money payoff to change the payoff of the other agent.  
( , )BWTP m y  is defined similarly, for preferences B .  ( , )AWTP m y  or ( , )BWTP m y  can be 
positive, zero, or negative and their magnitude and sign can change with different values 
of m  or y . 
 
Definition of More Altruistic Than (MAT):  For a given domain 2D R  we say that 
 MAT A B  on D  if ( , ) ( , )A BWTP m y WTP m y  for all ( , )m y D . 
 
Let sup{ : 0 . .( , ) }Hm m y s t m y H
     and sup{ : 0 . .( , ) }Hy y m s t m y H
     .  
 
Definition of More Generous Than (MGT):  Opportunity set 2G R  is more generous 
than opportunity set 2F R  if: (a) 0G Fm m
    and (b) G Fm m
   G Fy y
   .  In that 
case, one writes G MGT F . 
 
The second mover knows the collection Ȼ of possible opportunity sets.  Prior to her 
choice of payoffs, the second mover learns the actual opportunity set C  chosen by the 
first mover from the set Ȼ and acquires preferences CA .  
 
Axiom R:  Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover 
from the collection Ȼ.  If ,F G   Ȼ and  MGT G F , then  MAT G FA A . 
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Suppose that the collection of opportunity sets Ȼ contains at least two elements.  Let 
*C  Ȼ be the status quo opportunity set.  Let *CA  denote the second mover’s acquired 
preferences when the opportunity set chosen by the first mover is the status quo set.  Let 
CA  denote the second mover’s acquired preferences when the first mover choses an 
opportunity set C  that differs from the status quo set.  When Ȼ is a singleton, the first 
mover has no choice distinct from the status quo set, and we write Ȼ = { oC } with 
corresponding second mover preferences oCA .     
 
Axiom S:  Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover 
from the collection Ȼ.  If the status quo is either F  or G  and  MGT G F  then: 
1. * MAT ,C oGG GA A A  and *,  MAT o CF F FA A A , 
2. *GA  MAT oGA  if G  MGT C  for all C Ȼ, and oFA  MAT *FA  if  
C  MGT F  for all C Ȼ. 
  
38 
 
Appendix B: Subject Instructions and Decision Forms  
Experiment 1 (RANDOM 15,5T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)   All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Players A and Players B.   
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Before the decision tasks begin, the experimenter provides a starting balance of $15 to 
each Player A.   The experimenter provides each Player B with a starting balance of $5. 
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Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to give $5 to the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision 
by circling the “Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B” statement on the 
decision form. If Player A decides not to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he 
makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to make no 
change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Players B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, 
please think about your decisions carefully.  Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 15/5) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15.  Player B starts with $5. 
 
 
DECISION (1):  Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2):  Player A decides to give $5 to Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15.  Player B starts with $5. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
42 
 
DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15.  Player B starts with $5. 
 
IF Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION G1 OR DECISION G2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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Experiment 1 (RANDOM 10,10T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)  All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Players A and Players B. 
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately; you should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Before the decision tasks begin, the experimenter provides a starting balance of $10 to 
each Player A.   The experimenter also provides each Player B with a starting balance of 
$10. 
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Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to take $5 from the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to take $5 from the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her 
decision by circling the “Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B” 
statement on the decision form. If Player A decides not to take $5 from the paired 
Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to 
make no change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision T2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Player B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, please 
think about your all of decisions carefully. Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 10/10) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10.  Player B starts with $10. 
 
 
DECISION (1): Player A decides to take $5 from Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2): Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10.  Player B starts with $10. 
 
 IF Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision T2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION T1 OR DECISION T2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10.  Player B starts with $10. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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DAY 1 
(Experiment 2: Both treatments) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Earnings quiz 
In today’s part of the experiment you will be asked to complete a quiz. Each participant 
will be asked to answer the same set of 40 questions, selected from a large test bank. 
Your quiz score will be the number of questions you answer correctly minus 1/4 of a 
point for each question that you answer incorrectly (i.e., 1 correct answer = 1 point; 1 
incorrect answer = - 1/4 point).  
 
After everyone has completed the experiment the final scores will be ranked from the 
highest to the lowest and ties will be resolved randomly.  Once the complete ranking of 
the participants has been determined, the participants who scored in the top 25% will 
receive a certificate for $15, those in the middle 25-75% will receive a certificate for $10, 
and those in the bottom 25% will receive a certificate for $5.  
 
IMPORTANT: Please bring your certificates to the DAY 2 part of the experiment. They 
provide your start up money for the second part of the experiment. At the end of the DAY 
2 session your experimental earnings will be converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate 
(i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings will be worth 1 NZD in cash). 
 
Please mark your answer in the quiz by clicking inside the dialog box to the left of the 
option you want to select. You have 40 minutes to complete the quiz. 
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DAY 2 
(Experiment 2: TOURNAMENT 15,5T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)   All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You have been divided into two groups, called Players A and Players B.  Participants who 
scored in the top 25% in the quiz on DAY 1 will be Players A and participants who scored 
in the bottom 25% will be Players B. 
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Your starting balances for this DAY 2 part of the experiment were determined by your 
performance on DAY 1 of this experiment: 
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Each Player A earned $15 on DAY 1 by scoring in the top 25% on the quiz. 
Each Player B earned $5 on DAY 1 by scoring in the bottom 25% on the quiz. 
 
Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to give $5 to the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision 
by circling the “Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B” statement on the 
decision form. If Player A decides not to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he 
makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to make no 
change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Players B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, 
please think about your decisions carefully.  Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 15/5) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 
DECISION (1):  Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2):  Player A decides to give $5 to Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION G1 OR DECISION G2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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DAY 2 
(Experiment 2: TOURNAMENT 10,10T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)  All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You have been divided randomly into two groups, called Players A and Players B.  
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately; you should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Your starting balances for this DAY 2 part of the experiment were determined by your 
performance on DAY 1 of this experiment:  
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Each Player A earned $10 on DAY 1 by scoring in the middle 25 – 75% on the quiz. 
Each Player B earned $10 on DAY 1 by scoring in the middle 25 – 75% on the quiz. 
 
Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to take $5 from the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to take $5 from the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her 
decision by circling the “Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B” 
statement on the decision form. If Player A decides not to take $5 from the paired 
Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to 
make no change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision T2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Player B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, please 
think about your all of decisions carefully. Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 10/10) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 
DECISION (1): Player A decides to take $5 from Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2): Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 IF Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision T2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION T1 OR DECISION T2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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DAY 1 
(Experiment 3: TARGET 15,5T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Earning $5 
 
Earnings quiz 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to complete a quiz. Each participant will 
be asked to answer a set of questions, selected from a large test bank. However, 
participants in different sessions are asked to provide a different minimum number of 
correct answers (10, 20, or 30) for which they are paid different amount ($5, $10, or $15, 
respectively). You have been randomly selected to be in a $5 session, which means that 
in order to participate in DAY 2 of the experiment, you have to answer 10 questions 
correctly. If you provide 10 correct answers, you will receive a certificate for $5. 
 
IMPORTANT: Please bring your certificate to the DAY 2 part of the experiment. It 
provides your start up money for the second part of the experiment. At the end of the 
DAY 2 session your experimental earnings will be converted into cash at the 3:4 
exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings will be worth 1 NZD in 
cash). 
 
Please mark your answer in the quiz by clicking inside the dialog box to the left of the 
option you want to select.  
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DAY 1 
(Experiment 3: TARGET 15,5T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Earning $15 
 
Earnings quiz 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to complete a quiz. Each participant will 
be asked to answer a set of questions, selected from a large test bank. However, 
participants in different sessions are asked to provide a different minimum number of 
correct answers (10, 20, or 30) for which they are paid different amount ($5, $10, or $15, 
respectively). You have been randomly selected to be in a $15 session, which means that 
in order to participate in DAY 2 of the experiment, you have to answer 30 questions 
correctly. If you provide 30 correct answers, you will receive a certificate for $15. 
 
IMPORTANT: Please bring your certificate to the DAY 2 part of the experiment. It 
provides your start up money for the second part of the experiment. At the end of the 
DAY 2 session your experimental earnings will be converted into cash at the 3:4 
exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings will be worth 1 NZD in 
cash). 
 
Please mark your answer in the quiz by clicking inside the dialog box to the left of the 
option you want to select. 
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DAY 2 
(Experiment 3: TARGET 15,5T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)  All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You have been divided randomly into two groups, called Players A and Players B.  
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately; you should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant. 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Your starting balances for this DAY 2 part of the experiment were determined by your 
performance on DAY 1 of this experiment:  
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Each Player A earned $15 on DAY 1 providing 30 correct answers on the quiz. 
Each Player B earned $5 on DAY 1 by providing 10 correct answers on the quiz. 
 
Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to give $5 to the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision 
by circling the “Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B” statement on the 
decision form. If Player A decides not to give $5 to the paired Player B, (s)he 
makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to make no 
change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Players B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, 
please think about your decisions carefully.  Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 15/5) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 
DECISION (1):  Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2):  Player A decides to give $5 to Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 15/5, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $15 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $5 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to give $5 to Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision G1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision G2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION G1 OR DECISION G2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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DAY 1 
(Experiment 3: TARGET 10,10T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Earning $10 
 
Earnings quiz 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to complete a quiz. Each participant will 
be asked to answer a set of questions, selected from a large test bank. However, 
participants in different sessions are asked to provide a different minimum number of 
correct answers (10, 20, or 30) for which they are paid different amount ($5, $10, or $15, 
respectively). You have been randomly selected to be in a $10 session, which means that 
in order to participate in DAY 2 of the experiment, you have to answer 20 questions 
correctly. If you provide 20 correct answers, you will receive a certificate for $10. 
 
IMPORTANT: Please bring your certificate to the DAY 2 part of the experiment. It 
provides your start up money for the second part of the experiment. At the end of the 
DAY 2 session your experimental earnings will be converted into cash at the 3:4 
exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings will be worth 1 NZD in 
cash). 
 
Please mark your answer in the quiz by clicking inside the dialog box to the left of the 
option you want to select.  
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DAY 2 
(Experiment 3: TARGET 10,10T ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get 5 NZD as a show up fee for today’s session and, in addition, have 
the opportunity to earn money in the experiment.  Your experimental earnings (in $) will be 
converted into cash at the 3:4 exchange rate (i.e., each $0.75 of your experimental earnings 
will be worth 1 NZD.)  All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You have been divided randomly into two groups, called Players A and Players B.  
 
Anonymity  
Each Player A will be randomly paired with a Player B.  No one will learn the identity of the 
player (s)he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by the following procedure.  You will collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from our research assistant in exchange for your 
experiment ID slip.  Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  The only 
identifying mark in all records will be the experiment ID which is known only by you.  
Although the experimenters will not know your identity, they will know how much to pay 
you because you will write your experiment ID number on all response forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment, each subject will walk by himself or herself to another room to 
collect their money payoff envelope from our research assistant who will not be present 
during the decision making part of the experiment. You will be the only person in 
possession of your experiment ID slip. When collecting the envelope, you are kindly 
requested not to open it immediately; you should wait until you leave the building. After 
collecting the envelope, you must return your experiment ID slip to our research assistant 
 
Starting Money Balances  
Your starting balances for this DAY 2 part of the experiment were determined by your 
performance on DAY 1 of this experiment:  
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Each Player A earned $10 on DAY 1 by providing 20 correct answers on the quiz. 
Each Player B earned $10 on DAY 1 by providing 20 correct answers on the quiz. 
 
Player A’s Decision Task 
 Each Player A decides whether or not to take $5 from the paired Player B.  
 If Player A decides to take $5 from the paired Player B, (s)he makes his/her 
decision by circling the “Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B” 
statement on the decision form. If Player A decides not to take $5 from the paired 
Player B, (s)he makes his/her decision by circling the “Player A has decided to 
make no change in payoffs” statement.  
Player A is asked to circle only one of the two decisions.  If Player A does not circle a 
decision or circles both decisions, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decision, Player A places the decision form in the 
manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it.   
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Each Player B makes a decision for both of the two possible Player A decisions: 
 
 If Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B, Player B chooses between: 
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision T2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 If Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs, Player B chooses 
between: 
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decision N2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
Player B makes his/her decisions by circling one of the two possible decisions on each of 
the two decision forms.  Player B is asked to circle only one of the two possible decisions 
on each of the two decision forms. If Player B does not circle any decision or circles both 
decisions on the same decision form, (s)he will be paid only the show-up fee at the end of 
the experiment.  After making his/her decisions, Player B puts both decision forms in the 
large manila envelope and waits for the experimenter to collect it. 
 
Note that Player A’s decision will determine which decision of Player B will be relevant.  
However, Player B will not know in advance which one will be chosen. Therefore, please 
think about your all of decisions carefully. Are there any questions? 
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER A (Treatment 10/10) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player A: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 
DECISION (1): Player A decides to take $5 from Player B 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s payoff by $6 
 
 
OR 
 
 
DECISION (2): Player A decides to make no change in payoffs 
 
Subsequently, Player B will decide to:  
 
Make no further change in payoffs 
OR 
Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION (1) OR DECISION (2) BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 1) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
 IF Player A has decided to take $5 from Player B THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision T1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision T2: Decrease his/her own payoff by $2 in order to decrease player A’s 
payoff by $6 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION T1 OR DECISION T2 BUT 
NOT BOTH.
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DECISION FORM FOR PLAYER B (Treatment 10/10, page 2) 
 
 
Experiment ID of Player B: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player A starts with $10 he/she earned on DAY 1.  Player B starts with $10 he/she 
earned on DAY 1. 
 
IF Player A has decided to make no change in payoffs THEN 
 
Player B chooses between:  
 
Decision N1: Make no further change in payoffs 
 
OR 
 
Decision N2:  Decrease his/her own payoff by $1 in order to increase player A’s 
payoff by $2 
 
 
 
YOU MUST CIRCLE EITHER DECISION N1 OR DECISION N2 BUT 
NOT BOTH. 
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Appendix C: IOU Certificate 
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Appendix D: Discussion of a Heuristic Application of Prospect Theory 
 
 It has been argued that cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) implies that the 15,5T  and 10,10T  treatments are not isomorphic because of loss 
aversion relative to the endowments as reference points.  Here is a critical examination of 
this type of heuristic application of prospect theory.  Recall that prospect theory models 
self-regarding (“selfish”) preferences on a lottery space.  Suppose one views the second 
mover’s payoff at a terminal node as a degenerate lottery.  Also suppose that the second 
mover’s payoff at any terminal node is coded as the difference between the money payoff 
at the node and his endowed payoff (a reference point). Then the value function v(  ) 
gives utilities for the payoffs at the four terminal nodes in the 15,5T  treatment as (from left 
to right in Figure 1.a): v(5-5), v(3-5), v(10-5), and v(9-5).  Similarly, the value function 
evaluates payoffs at the four terminal nodes in the 10,10T  treatment as (from left to right in 
Figure 1.b): v(5-10), v(3-10), v(10-10), and v(9-10).  These values (or utilities) imply the 
same choices as does the “economic man” model of choice on a commodity space: 
choose (15,5) on the left branch and (10,10) on the right branch in both games.  In this 
way, a discussant’s suggested heuristic application of prospect theory actually implies 
that the 15,5T  and 10,10T  treatments are isomorphic, not the opposite. 
